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There is a certain allure to the idea that cities allow a person to both feel at home and like a
stranger in the same place. That one can know the streets and shops, avenues and alleys, while also
going days without being recognized. But as elites fill cities with “smart” technologies — turning them
into platforms for the “Internet of Things” (IoT): sensors and computation embedded within physical
objects that then connect, communicate, and/or transmit information with or between each other
through the Internet — there is little escape from a seamless web of surveillance and power. This
paper will outline a social theory of the “smart city” by developing our Deleuzian concept of the
“spectrum of control.” We present two illustrative examples: biometric surveillance as a form of
monitoring, and automated policing as a particularly brutal and exacting form of manipulation. We
conclude by offering normative guidelines for governance of the pervasive surveillance and control
mechanisms that constitute an emerging critical infrastructure of the “smart city.”
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I. Introduction
There is a certain allure to the idea that cities allow a person to both feel at home and like a
stranger in the same place. That one can know the streets and shops, avenues and alleys, while also
going days without being recognized. But as government and corporate actors, often in close
partnership with each other, fill cities with “smart” [1] technologies — turning them into platforms for
the “Internet of Things” (IoT): sensors and computation embedded within physical objects that then
connect, communicate, and/or transmit information with or between each other through the Internet
— there is little escape from a seamless web of surveillance (cf., Hollands, 2008; Townsend, 2014;
Neirotti, et al., 2014). Soon, for example, shoppers and viewers will be as “known” by a store or
gallery as they are able to know it (Arnsdorf, 2010). Facial recognition software, or smartphone
emanations, can project your identity, likely spending habits, and reputation: shoplifter or big
spender, “Mortgage Woes” or “Boomer Barons” (to use actual categories from marketers) (Castle
Press, 2010).
“Big data” is the new currency of commerce, but like money, some have far better terms of access
to it than others. In finance, the average borrower must turn over detailed, personal records to
receive a loan; the bank is under no parallel obligation, though, to explain its own internal decision
making in nearly as much detail (Pasquale, 2015). The same dynamics are emerging in the IoT:
powerful entities centripetally attracting more data from their users, but denying access to users and
regulators, even when very troubling data uses and breaches occur. It no longer makes sense to
think of “the Internet” as a thing that one accesses via a computer. Not when the city itself is
reimagined and reconstructed as a platform for and node within networked information
communication technologies (ICT).
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/5903/4660
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Wired’s flagship article on the IoT asks, “Have you ever lost an object in your house and dreamed
that you could just type a search for it, as you would for a wayward document on your hard drive?”
(Wasik, 2013). Well you can now, we are assured, thanks to a startup called StickNFind Technologies
that sells cheap, small, “sticker” sensors. Lose a child at the mall? “Smart fashion” RFID tags will
keep him or her plugged into the network and tracked at all times. And why stop with kids when
making sensorladen sartorial choices? Before long your car, house, appliances, and every other
part of your environment will be engaging in a constant stream of networked communication with
each other. Taken at the urban scale, the city becomes a cocoon of connectivity that engulfs us —
or, alternatively, it becomes a web that ensnares us — as smart technologies are integrated into our
everyday lives. These technologies are billed as modes of finding, of wayfaring. They are
technologies of search (when we apply them) and technologies of reputation (when used to evaluate
us) (Pasquale, 2015). They map, categorize, and classify — and what could be more innocuous than
mere information?
Calculating the costs and benefits of the innovation is a Sisyphean, and deeply ideological, task. Who
knows what sinister or spectacular applications may emerge? Scenario analysis and planning could
be a valuable alternative to costbenefit studies (Verchick, 2010): these methods acknowledge the
incommensurability of the gains in convenience, and losses of privacy, portended by the IoT. But
corporate and government discourse on IoT has tended to marginalize the most important negative
scenario analyses, downplaying them as paranoid projections. Technocrats distort policy evaluations
of pervasive surveillance and control in urban environments. Moreover, their normative tools of
evaluation, focusing on consumer and citizen “consent” to surveillance, are manipulable enough to
embrace even the most disturbing technologies of control — such as dronedriven crowd control
directed at protesters, or automobile loan technology that disables cars mere minutes after a
payment is late — as expressions of democratic will and market rationality.
Technocrats’ convenient blindness to the most worrisome aspects of the “smart city” invites a more
balanced theoretical response. We propose one such response that lays out the characteristics and
consequences of a dominant sociopolitical logic that courses throughout and ties together many of
the various practices and ideologies related to “smart cities.” We begin by providing a contextual
overview of the “smart city,” building from the burgeoning analytical work on the topic. This leads
into a critical introduction to the ideology of the “smart city,” focusing on the stated aspirations of
some of its most notable corporate, governmental, and academic exponents. We then offer a
Deleuzian alternative, outlining a social theory of the “smart city” in service to capital as a form of
control (rather than emancipation) of its subjectcitizens. Next, we present two illustrative examples
along the resulting spectrum of control: biometric surveillance as a form of monitoring, and
automated policing as a particularly brutal and exacting form of manipulation. Our penultimate
section makes explicit the stakes of the deep integration of person–machine — city in our “post
digitaldualist era” (Jurgenson, 2012). And we end by offering some normative guidelines for
governance of the pervasive surveillance and control mechanisms that constitute the emerging
critical infrastructure of the “smart city.”

II. What is a smart city?
Globally — in terms of market valuation, expendable capital, technological development, and
transformative influence — the smart city movement has been growing at a rapid pace. A 2013
report, released by the United Kingdom’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, estimated
that “the global market for smart city solutions and the additional services required to deploy them
[will] be $408 billion by 2020.” Linked to this growth is the exponential expansion of the IoT.
According to commonly cited numbers from telecommunications giant Cisco, one of the major
industries involved in the IoT and smart cities, billions of things are already connected — “over 12.5
billion devices in 2010 alone.” And they predict, “Some 25 billion devices will be connected by 2015,
and 50 billion by 2020.” [2] Less conservative estimates place the smart city market into the
trillion(s) of dollars over the next five to ten years, with the IoT market being worth even more.
Case in point, IBM recently announced it would be investing US$3 billion over the next four years in
creating a new IoT unit (Reuters, 2015) — an investment that will surely boost IBM’s already
lucrative, multibillion dollar “Smarter Planet” initiative. As an urban planning and governance
movement, a lot of effort is expended on pushing and pulling “smartness” — the major corporate
players work hard to push smartness as an ideal and to pull city leaders and investors into the
smartness orbit. These corporations did not just stumble upon an existing market for which they
could fill the needs. They, rather, have worked hard to create this market and to shape it in certain
ways.
Yet, with this massive growth and capital investment, the label “smart city” is nebulous. There’s not
a single definition that can be called up and applied anytime the label is invoked (Hollands, 2008).
This ambiguity does a lot of work for smart city proponents and purveyors. The label is treated like
a floating signifier that can change referents whenever needed. Allowing for a flexible, dynamic
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/5903/4660
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space in which to plug a variety of products, practices, and policies. Giving them discursive cover in
case they need to distance themselves if something goes wrong or doesn’t deliver on a promise.
One important and constant characteristic of these different visions, however, is that they aim to
evoke positive change and innovation — at least as the proponents see it — via digital ICT;
essentially, building an IoT at the cityscale by installing networked objects throughout the urban
environment (and even human bodies) for a wide range of different purposes. The typical examples
used to illustrate an IoTfilled world are consumer products — like the everpresent smart fridge that
tells the store when you need milk. But, Bruce Sterling argues, this is a “fairy tale,” instead “the
genuine Internet of Things wants to invade that refrigerator, measure it, instrument it, monitor any
interactions with it; it would cheerfully give away a fridge at cost” [3]. Restricting our focus to the
consumer devices poses a red herring that keeps our attention at the surface level, halting analyses
that should go beyond the alternating currents of absurd farce and gee whiz excitement. “These
grand, worldscale [corporate] alliances did not form in order to sell the reader a smart refrigerator.
Most of them would really like the reader to dwell in a ‘Smart City’ where they supply the
‘smartness’ on their own terms — and they’re not much concerned about the reader’s consent as a
citizen” [4]. The smart city is not just a linearly scaled version of the smart home where all of our
personal devices and domestic appliance are networked, automated, and good communicators. It is
fundamentally about infrastructural and civic applications — the kind of things that constitute the
technopolitical ordering of society — and it is about the data and control those applications
generate. To be sure, not all “smart cities” are implemented in the same way; we see three main
types.
First, by far the most common ‘actually existing’ smart cities are those that are retrofitted and
renovated with upgrades that transition current cities from dumb to smart. Many estimates place the
number of cities and towns with smart initiatives into the tens or hundreds of thousands around the
world. In these cases, “the smart city is assembled piecemeal, integrated awkwardly into existing
configurations of urban governance and the built environment” [5]. Typically the underlying
motivations are political economic, the result of an increasingly entrepreneurial form of urban
governance that seeks to make the city into a center of (regionally or globally) competitive
economic growth and activity (Harvey, 1989). Getting smart is the handy panacea for overcoming
austerity, managing the urban system, and becoming an attractive place for capital to flow into — all
by using “networked infrastructures to improve economic and political efficiency and enable social,
cultural and urban development” [6]. Hence, smart initiatives promise to provide city leaders with
the means necessary for achieving their entrepreneurial ends.
Second, there is the ‘shock therapy’ method — or, what we might call smart shock — wherein a city
undergoes a quick, largescale integration of ‘smart’ ideals, technologies, and policies into an
existing landscape. There are not as yet any cities that have experienced a full shock, but rather
there are examples where the smart city transition has occurred to a greater degree and at a more
rapid pace than the typical retrofits. Perhaps the best example is the Intelligent Operations Center
built in 2010 by IBM for the city of Rio de Janeiro, which “draws together data streams from thirty
agencies, including traffic and public transport, municipal and utility services, emergency services,
weather feeds, and information sent in by employees and the public via phone, Internet and radio,
into a single data analytics centre” [7]. With this NASAesque control room, the city of Rio is turned
into a system for optimization and securitization. Different parts of city life can be scrutinized and
managed at a more exacting level, thus amplifying the already existing practices of militaristic urban
control (Wacquant, 2008). IBM and other technology corporations have created similar data centers
elsewhere for single agencies like police departments, but none have yet reached the magnitude of
Rio’s Intelligent Operations Center. Though, there is plenty of indication that Rio foreshadows the
type of systems we can expect to see being rapidly built and deployed in other cities.
Third, the idealistic models for the smart city are the built from scratch projects that are being
constructed where nothing existed before. A canonical case is New Songdo in South Korea, which
serves as a global testbed (Halpern, et al., 2013) and urban laboratory (Gieryn, 2006) for
implementing largescale smart systems in the wild. At a cost of approximately US$40 billion,
Songdo’s corporate and government backers hope to make it the world’s first fully smart city. As
Christine Rosen (2012) remarks, “Songdo claims intelligence not from its inhabitants, but from the
millions of wireless sensors and microcomputers embedded in surfaces and objects throughout the
metropolis.” This type of implementation represents a zone of futurity. That is, a window into a
grand, but plausibly potential, urban future. Furthermore, this type also reveals striking historical
similarities that exists between the smart city ideology and the ideology of twentieth century high
modernist architecture. Consider that Brazil’s federal capital of Brasília — a monument to the high
modernism ideals of technocratic administrative ordering — was built, in only 41 months (1956–
1960), by clearing out a plot of land in the Amazon rainforest (Scott, 1998). “Point by point,” writes
Adam Greenfield [8], “whether they do so out of ignorance, ahistoricity, heedlessness or hubris, the
designers of Songdo and Masdar and PlanIT Valley [other canonical smart cities] recapitulate the
overspecification, overweening scientism and ponderous authoritarian pomposity of Chandigarh and
Brasília, right down to the grand ceremonial axes.”
Even with this plurality of methods and motivations, we believe it is possible and necessary to begin
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/5903/4660
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parsing out the underlying sociopolitical logics that these smart city initiatives hold in common. As
we have shown, there’s no sign that the smart city is slowing down. The ideals and practices of the
movement — in the various styles they are implemented — continue to colonize the urban landscape
and political imaginations of city leaders. Given the constraints of this paper, our overview is only
meant to set the stage for the critical social theory at the heart of this paper. For a more exhaustive
genealogical analysis of the dominant discourses and ideologies that are driving these sociotechnical
systems and policies — specifically those emanating from the major corporate actors of IBM, Cisco,
and Siemens — we point the reader to Adam Greenfield’s thorough pamphlet, Against the smart city
(2013). What’s more, we should be clear that our generalized use of “smart city” in the rest of the
article is meant to be a shorthand for technologies and techniques that align with both the practices
and ideologies of the “smart city” label — no matter what their scale or style of implementation. We
don’t intend to homogenize or flatten out the differences in what the “smart city” means for different
cities, policymakers, and corporations. Rather, our hope is to draw attention to the ways in which
seemingly disparate technologies and techniques have origins in and reproduce common socio
political logics — and we will do this by discussing specific initiatives. But first, the next section
introduces the ideologies — updating and adding depth to Greenfield’s own study — that are
embedded within and enacted by smart city initiatives.

III. The ideology of the smart city
In more formal spaces of policy advocacy, a stark meliorism informs a Whiggish imaginary of
technological progress via the IoT. In a widely cited article for Foreign Affairs, two chief executives
for Cisco trumpeted the benefits of applying the “Internet of Everything” to nearly all aspects of city
infrastructure and governance (Chambers and Elfrink, 2014). They promised “intelligent and efficient
stewardship of growing cities” to reduce “traffic, parking congestion, pollution, energy consumption,
and crime.” Who could be against such a program? The only cost, the executives assure readers,
would be a slight reorientation in governance and IT procurement strategies. First, “the world must
rethink IT investments” by “moving away from purchasing isolated services and instead focusing on
endtoend solutions that are integrated across disparate or siloed systems.” Second, “hyper
collaborative partnerships between the public and private sectors” with strict “adherence to
deadlines” is essential. As one of their principles for making smart cities the global “norm”
proclaims, “the world can’t be afraid of embracing technology in new ways. This means rethinking
the contract with citizens and the services IT firms and governments provide them” (Chamber and
Elfrink, 2014).
The shift in political language — wherein the social contract is replaced by the corporate contract —
is subtle, but critical for understanding the politics smuggled into the technocratic agenda of smart
cities (cf., Sadowski and Selinger, 2014). This explains why the six principles they propose are all
based on admonishing “city leaders” for not valorizing (enough) the products and services offered
by the ICT sector. Like savvy businessmen, the authors recognize the asymmetry of publicprivate
partnerships in an era of neoliberalism. When top managers at firms earn many multiples of top civil
servants, the latter readily allow the private sphere to reshape the public sphere in its own image.
Corporations can afford a phalanx of economists, designers, attorneys, and public relations
specialists, all skilled in presenting one possible future for the city as a technocratic pensée unique.
Indeed, other than the corporate model, “there exist no largescale alternative smart city models,
partly because most cities have generally embraced a probusiness and entrepreneurial governance
model of urban development” [9].
Of course, Cisco has a commercial interest here: designing, manufacturing, and installing the
hardware for these networks is Cisco’s lifeblood, and future profit margins may depend on the firm’s
ability to craft seductive narratives of ‘smartness.’ But numerous municipal leaders and nonprofit
foundations have jumped on the bandwagon, as well. There are material motivations here, too, as
politicoeconomic analyses of revolving door employment patterns between private, public, and
“third” sector concerns reveal. When civil servants can easily multiply their pay by moving from
government to corporate offices, as long as they are pliable and cooperative, few have an incentive
to ask hard questions (Carpenter and Moss, 2013). The boundaries between public office and private
consulting are porous.
Just as important as material motives and career ambition, the narrative of the smart city, as an
interpretation of technological systems, rationalizes these urban transformations (Söderström, et al.,
2014). In a commentary on smart cities research, geographer Rob Kitchin argues that it is
problematic the way in which “much of the writing and rhetoric about smart cities” — whether
stemming from business, academia, or government — “seeks to appear nonideological,
commonsensical and pragmatic” [10]. This is an outgrowth of a technocratic neoliberal ideology, and
a broader political economic imaginary of stable extraction of profits and taxes. Advocates of the
smart city style themselves as hardheaded problem solvers who transcend the zerosum politics
that cause other to become embroiled in gridlocked conflict. Yet, they all too often slip into the
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/5903/4660
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attitude memorably parodied by Clifford Geertz as “I have a social philosophy; you have political
opinions; he has an ideology” [11]. Here the “I” might be smart city contractors; the “you,” city
leaders; and “he” the various interest groups raising deeper concerns about the implementation of
mass surveillance, data processing, and control. Take, for instance, a speech by Samuel Palmisano
(2010), then the Chairman, President, and CEO of IBM, in which he asserted, “Building a smarter
planet is realistic precisely because it is so refreshingly nonideological.” However, as Geertz
advises, the deployment of the term ideology is one of the most ideologized practices of modern
rhetoric, a way of concealing the more contestable values and assumptions driving those dismissing
their opponents as ideological. In this paper, we do not use the term ideology as an a priori
accusation, but rather in its descriptive capacity — and somewhat ironically since many technologists
and neoliberals alike expend so much energy claiming that their practices are the results of a value
free, Progressdriven, extrahuman force (e.g., technology and markets).
To better understand the invariably political character of the smart city, consider a logical extension
of some current smart city thinking, proposed as a thought experiment by philosopher and legal
theorist Lawrence Solum. Singapore has “smart intersections that var[y] their red/green cycles
according to traffic” (Baum, 2001), and one can imagine far more elaborate methods of controlling
the flow of automobiles. Solum posits the development of an “Artificially Intelligent Traffic Authority
(AITA),” which could “adapt itself to changes in driver behavior and traffic flow” [12]. The system
would be designed to “introduce random variations and run controlled experiments to evaluate the
effects of various combinations on traffic pattern” [13], recalling Jim Manzi’s (2012)
recommendations for far more experimentation in public policy. But the system would not be very
forgiving of individual experimentation with, say, violating its rules. Rather, as imagined by Solum,
“[v]iolations would be detected by an elaborate system of electronic surveillance” and offenders
would be “identified and immediately would be removed from traffic by a system of cranes located
at key intersections” [14].
Solum uses this example to break down the usual distinctions between human and artificial meaning
in law, rather than as a policy proposal for the future of traffic. The scenario is just as useful to flag
the inevitably legal and political aspects of automated law enforcement, even in an area as
seemingly technical as traffic. Would the cranes posited in Solum’s hypothetical surgically remove
protesters, like the Ferguson marchers, who blocked highways (Harcourt, 2012)? Would anyone with
an expired license or tags be plucked away as well — in a vision already halfrealized by subprime
lenders who stop cars remotely as soon as a payment is late (Sadowski and Pasquale, 2014)?
The problem for smart city advocates is one of overcoming several tensions, if not outright
contradictions, in their idealtype of corporatized governance. Who is ultimately in charge of “hyper
collaborative partnerships between the public and private sectors?” What are the penalties when,
say, deadlines are not met? Who imposes them? What are the problems that the smart city will use
“endtoend solutions” to solve? How will the imposition of such “solutions” be sequenced?
To take some obvious examples: should new forms of surveillance focus first on drug busts, or
evidence of whitecollar crime, or unfair labor practices by employers? Wage theft is a massive
problem, but rarely taken seriously by authorities (Bobo, 2011). Do the cameras and sensors in
restaurants focus on preventing employee theft of food, stopping food poisoning, and/or catching
safety violations? Does “traffic control” include efforts to stop honking of horns and loud motorcycles
late at night in urban neighborhoods, or is that healthdamaging noise deemed just as unworthy of
computational scrutiny as it is casually excused by millions of small acts of policing discretion each
year — as opposed to the charge of “blocking pedestrian traffic” that is commonly used by police as
an excuse to harass AfricanAmericans standing on empty sidewalks (Taibbi, 2014)? Would
autonomous car control systems prioritize preventing pedestrian deaths, or merely aspire to smooth
flows of cars into and out of the city?
The ideology of neoliberalism all too often provides rapid, “obvious,” and unchallenged answers,
based on dubious costbenefit analyses. Its summum bonum is to improve the business environment
and spread market logics to all dimensions of human life. Yet problems multiply even within the
neoliberal framework, particularly as it expects state actors to realize business goals (and vice
versa). The state itself must capitulate to (and coordinate) its subjects’ purported emancipation from
it. So, as Philip Mirowski argues, there is a neoliberal pattern of “hav[ing] it both ways: to stridently
warn of the perils of expanding purview of state activity while simultaneously imagining the strong
state of their liking rendered harmless” [15]. These tensions are a formal feature of ideological
thought: it is a way of containing and coordinating commitments that are contradictory either in
theory or practice (Geertz, 1973).
Although these ideological beliefs are most often pegged to Wall Street and Silicon Valley, they can
be found, without much difficulty, in even our highest legislative bodies. In February 2015, the
United States Senate held a hearing called “The Connected World: Examining the Internet of Things”
[16]. The hearing featured statements from senators and testimony from a panel of five witnesses.
The attitudes throughout were overwhelmingly excited for the smarter lives we will all be leading
thanks to the IoT. While there were occasional mentions of basic issues related to security and
privacy, most of the concern stemmed from worries about “over regulation,” which meant anything
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/5903/4660
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more than a “light touch” approach. In his statement, U.S. Senator Cory Booker (D–NJ) neatly
encapsulated the political economic ideology on display in the hearing — and while he was more
enthusiastic and explicit in tone than others, his remarks are representative and worth quoting at
length:
“This is a phenomenal opportunity for a bipartisan, profoundly
patriotic approach to an issue that can explode our economy. I think
that there are trillions of dollars, creating countless jobs, improving
quality of life, [and] democratizing our society in ways that gives
advantages to people who are being marginalized on the edges,
breaking down barriers of race and class. We can’t even imagine the
future that this portends of, and we should be embracing that ... And
so a lot of my concerns are really what my Republican colleagues
also echoed — which is, we should be doing everything possible to
encourage this, and nothing to restrict it ... But for us to do anything
to inhibit that leap in humanity to me seems unfortunate ... And I also
believe that this should be a publicprivate partnership. We all have a
role.”
Booker’s statements are not radical. He is in fact channeling the mainstream views about innovation
in society. The least we can do is get out of the way. At best, our duty is to provide all the legal,
material, and ideological support we can for innovations — and their innovators — like the IoT.
Anybody who wishes to ask critical questions about the future, let alone actually constrain and slow
down technological development, is de facto extinguishing an exploding economy and standing in the
way of a democratizing force for justice.
Booker’s language recalls the puffery of finance capital — the same group he vigorously defended in
2012 after the leader of his political party (Barack Obama) gently suggested the possibility of ending
private equity tax loopholes. Overclaiming the value of the smart city is vital to contemporary capital
markets, since extreme inequality in wealth allows rentiers to live well even on the very low interest
rates offered by nearly riskfree sovereign debt. The “smart money” probably will understand the
“smart city” as an even more speculative bet if it peruses security experts’ warnings about the
security problems now endemic in the Internet of Things. (As Bruce Schneier (2014) has observed,
when computing is embedded into hardware (as is the case in most of the IoT), sensors and routers
are “riddled with vulnerabilities, and there’s no good way to patch them”). The riskier the
investment, the more spectacular the potential gains must be: thus the proliferation of
characterizations of smart city technology as epochal, groundbreaking, worldmaking.
Of course, the rhetoric is not always so grandiose — there are crosscutting, technocratic pressures
to sound cool, analytical, and mechanically objective when describing new technology. Bland
bipartisanship is also a favored rhetorical mood. Boosters lard manifestos, manuals, and exhortatory
books with simple, straightforward examples of problems all can agree need fixing (Newsom, 2013;
Townsend, 2014), in order to obscure the stakes of automated surveillance and regimentation of
every moment and place. A potholespotting app, for instance, is a step toward at least informing (if
not guaranteeing the filling of) an unmitigated, carharming bad. But not everyone agrees with, say,
Goldsmith and Crawford when they argue for “postprogressive” city management that focuses on
“results not compliance” [17], once the “results” desired move far beyond fast trash pickup or
smooth roads. Indeed, the very choice to deploy resources for road smoothing (rather than, say,
train or bus air conditioning, or green spaces) is an inherently political one. Goldsmith and Crawford
celebrate a new, “smart” fingerprinting initiative aimed at criminals [18], with nary a reflection on
the ways in which these records databases create underclasses of effectively unemployable
individuals.
Smart city advocates may counter that such conflicts over resource allocation are inevitable in any
political order, and stress that their own deployment of sensors, apps, open data, and progress
reporting cannot be expected to unravel them. But realities of scarcity apply to political attention,
problematization, and action as well. Time spent organizing to deploy a “platform for citizens to
engage city hall, and each other, through text, voice, social media, and other apps” [19], is time not
spent on highlighting the role of tax resistance by the wealthy in creating the very shortage of
personnel that smart cities are supposed to help cure by “force multiplication” of the cities’
remaining workers (Winters, 2011; Bady, 2013). Would Newark, New Jersey, need Mark
Zuckerberg’s donation of US$100 million to its school system, if so many others in the billionaire
class had not fought so hard to reduce their own (and corporate) taxes, shelter wealth abroad, and
defang regulation? Each time a “quantrepreneur” proposes ingenious new ways of measuring and
maximizing the “output” of government workers, a critical citizenry should ask: how did we come to
this pass? Where has the constant pressure to “do more with less” come from? Focusing on the tech
of “doing more” displaces critical debate on the why of “less” governmental resources and
employees.
The corporate and governmental actors behind the smart city ideal have distorted debate in two
ways. First, focusing on the narrow goals of promoting transparency and efficiency, they have
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/5903/4660
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obscured the revolutionary changes in law enforcement’s intensity, scope, and punitive impact
portended by pervasive surveillance systems that are easily embedded into a regime of ambient
law. Second, they offer a doubly crabbed view of the politics and ethics of digitizing space via the
IoT: as a post hoc constraint imposed on technical systems, primarily to encourage “privacy,” in the
individualistic sense of the right to control the collection of information about oneself.
By applying a hermeneutics of suspicion, a more complete — and troubling — social theory of the
smart city emerges. Even at the least intrusive end of the spectrum of control enabled by the IoT,
there is far more at stake than the nebulous set of concerns about perception and reputation
traditionally encapsulated in the umbrella term “privacy.” And at the far end of control, the stakes
are very high. The IoT is not simply a chance to watch people, but to produce and reproduce certain
patterns of interaction (Bogard, 1996), and to replace people with robotic agents once data about
them has been so pervasively recorded that it can be downloaded into an automaton to simulate
their actions.

IV. Smart cities in societies of control
What will a social theory of the smart city demand? As opposed to the ideology of advocates, social
theory is a “systematic, historically informed and empirically oriented theory seeking to explain the
nature of ‘the social,’” where the social “can be taken to mean the general range of recurring forms,
or patterned features, of interactions and relationships between people” [20]. To take on idealtypes
of interactions in urban environments, critical patterns include relationships of allocation/extraction,
oppression/emancipation, and recognition/misrecognition (Fraser, 1995). Close examination of the
phenomenology of being a surveilled subject, a data subject, reveals the vulnerability of each
resident of the smart city to extraction, oppression, and misrecognition.
In many ways, Foucault’s concept of biopower has explanatory fit. One form of biopower is, he
writes, “centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the
extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into
systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that
characterized the disciplines: an anatomopolitics of the human body” [21]. In contrast to the modes
of sovereign power that exercised the right “to take life or let live” [22], the modes of disciplinary
biopower exercise the ability to administer and manage bodies and populations. The smart city not
only operates on people in this way — for instance, viewing citizens as analogcumdigital
information nodes, or “citizen sensors” [23] — but it also reimagines and reconstructs the city, in
itself, as a machine, which can and must be administered and managed. One theorist, inspired by
Foucault’s concept of “governmentality,” has deemed this type of disciplining “smartmentality”
(Vanolo, 2014).
While the concept of biopower is certainly illuminating, it doesn’t give us the full picture. We can
reveal more about the smart city by applying a different social theory — one that explicitly sought to
succeed Foucault’s disciplinary societies, just as Foucault’s model succeeded the “societies of
sovereignty” — namely, Gilles Deleuze’s (1995) notion of “societies of control.” If the sovereign
power was, as Foucault points out, symbolized by the sword, and disciplinary biopower was
represented by industrial machines, then control corresponds to computer networks (Deleuze,
1995). Now, of course, the existence of one mode of power does not abolish the others. Rather, it is
a question of which one is the dominant operational logic. And, when applied to ICT, especially the
networked technologies of smart cities, Deleuze’s framework makes clear the common logics
underlying these practices and ideologies. We will provide a preliminary application of this
framework to demonstrate its merit as a social theory of the smart city.
A Deleuzian “society of control” has at least three crucial components — dividuals, rhizomes, and
passwords — which come together to form a continuously acting logic.
When one person observes another, a basic perceptual apparatus of sight and vision demands at
least some minimally holistic assessment. It is hard to register what a walking person is wearing, for
example, without also noticing gender, if the person limps or strides, is tall or short, among the
hundreds of other bits of tacit knowledge that may be conveyed by an appearance. Monitored by
sensors, by contrast, city dwellers are becoming less individuals than “dividuals”: entities ready to
be divided into any number of pieces, with specific factors separated, scrutinized, and surveilled.
What the person does becomes less important than the consequences calculated in response to
emanated data streams. For example: the metadata from a phone call may be far more fateful than
the talking which we usually take to be its purpose.
With digital technologies, the individual is atomized, blown apart into streams of data fed into
processors. And as these sensors gain immediate influence over physical objects like doors, fences,
and automobiles, there is little to no chance of the communicative dialogue that is a hallmark of
human interaction. Instead, these relations are at their core strategic, in the Habermasian sense,
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rather than communicative (Habermas, 1984). Consequences will result not from the “unforced force
of the better argument,” or even coaxing and cajoling, but rather, by force alone, as programmed
by a set of managers and software developers far removed in time and space from particular
implementations of programmed rules [24].
For example, facial recognition software enrolls a person’s face, and by extension the person it is
associated with, into a network, whether the person wants to be enrolled or not. Hackers now claim
they can even use photographs to identify fingerprints as well (Santus, 2014), a potentially massive
boon for law enforcement. The health wristband paints a picture of a self by collecting and analyzing
somatic data. The locationtracking sensor registers geospatial coordinates. The Department of
Homeland Security’s CellAll initiative senses “deadly” chemicals. The RFID reader only cares about
the chip in your wallet. The biometric lock is only concerned with your fingerprint or irises. The list of
ways that people are dividualized goes on. It is identity via synecdoche, where a factor — which
factor depends on the system — becomes representative of the whole and becomes all that matters.
The array of underlying technical systems, which are often hidden from sight and mind, can be
conceptualized as what Deleuze calls a “rhizome” — like the roots and shoots of a persistent,
massive set of plants, it seems to pop up everywhere. Rhizomes are assemblages of concepts,
relationships, materials, and actions. They have no distinct boundaries; rather, they are fluid fields,
always acting, pulsating power, emanating from multiple directions with varying intensities. The
city’s networked, ‘smart’ technological apparatus can simultaneously be: sensing chemicals in the
atmosphere; tracking bodies as they move through space; surveilling the types of faces on the
street; sending police to remove unwanted people; moving traffic along the roads; and more.
Even as a swarm of disconnected, “dumb” machines, this emerging rhizomatic apparatus of
monitoring and control can be intimidating. No one wants to be on the wrong side of its algorithms.
As urban technological networks grow vaster and more interconnected, secondary uses of data
barely imaginable at the time “users” begin participating in the IoT may well become commonplace
(Hoofnagle, 2003). Data gathers and brokers — from corporations to governments — will find a
plethora of uses for the information. Consider the biometric lock: Surely the times, places, and
identities of who is granted access will be categorized and logged, but what might be even more
interesting to authorities is the data for who is denied access.
And peoplequadividuals have freedom only insofar as all their “passwords” — the products of
dividualization that mark access or restriction, allowing one to move freely through or be stymied by
the rhizomatic system — are in working order. (Do you wish to enter through a keypad lock? Your
PIN is the password. Do you wish to purchase something? Your credit card is the password.) Life is
filled with these passwords. Yet, at any moment a password could be rejected — rightly or wrongly,
with or without your knowledge — and the amount of control the array of underlying mechanisms
have over you become bluntly apparent. Deleuze asked us to imagine “a city where one would be
able to leave one’s apartment, one’s street, one’s neighborhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic
card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or
between certain hours” [25]. As infrastructure decays and the rhizomatic tendrils extend further, city
dwellers increasingly feel the Kafkaesque frustration such a scenario entails.
Technology critics often portray these unexpected developments in technological control as a kind of
Frankenstein’s monster or sorcerer’s apprentice, one that “we” have unleashed via thoughtless
adoption of technology [26]. Social theorists must push the question of causation and agency
further, identifying the powerful actors who remain above the fray of dividualization, weaving a web
of forces that increasingly constrain the time and space of city dwellers (Krieger, 1994). Masses may
be consenting to be dividualized, but only a few wrote those terms and enforce them (Rothkopf,
2009).
Through Mirowski’s detailed analysis of the cause and context of the financial crisis, we can see how
these ‘smart’ initiatives plug into the ideologies and tactics of neoliberal political economy:
“Technocratic elites could intently maintain the fiction that ‘the people’ had their say, while
reconfiguring government functions in a neoliberal direction. These elite saboteurs would bring about
the neoliberal market society far more completely and efficaciously than waiting for the fickle public
to come around to their beliefs” [27]. The distinction between control and consent is important to
several recent initiatives toward the creation of smart cities. Pervasive interlinking of
surveillance/sensor arrays, computational processing, and virtual databases into the physical
structure of cities is only legitimate if citizens can, both politically and in individual encounters, can
be said to have “consented” to it. But when that consent is remote or indirect, its force, validity, and
scope should be vitiated. Internet “terms of service” are the idealtype of desiccated, hollow, pro
forma “consent” that is better termed obeisance, acquiescence, or learned helplessness. Thus the
overall pattern of relationships in the smart city results in a seamless “spectrum of control,” with
meritorious or merely creepy technologies directly imbricated with deeply disturbing ones.
The idea of a “spectrum of control” is more than a turn of phrase [28]. It serves as a symbolic
visualization of an interpretation of a text — here, the text is the city, considered simultaneously as
a kind of aesthetic object and software program. As Charles Taylor has stated, in canonical work on
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interpretive social science, interpretation “is an attempt to make clear, to make sense of an object
of study” that is in “some way confused, incomplete, cloudy, seeming contradictory — in one way or
another, unclear” [29]. Just as skilled commentators can interpret literature, judicial opinions, and
works of art, we should take the city’s increasingly technologized systems of governance as
expressive texts in need of interpretation.
Both the rhetoric of the “smart city,” and the actual city itself, are texts and textanalogues. They
are cloudy and confused now because so much theoretical effort has gone into separating out wheat
and chaff, to minimize “coercion” and maximize opportunities for “consent.” This wellmeaning, but
ultimately futile, normative agenda contributes to confusion and contradiction because the IoT and
allpervasive surveillance are building less a smart city than a cyborg city (Gandy, 2005) — urban
places where the stakes of access to certain prosthetic extensions of the self are ever rising. In such
cyborg cities concepts like consent vs. coercion, control vs. autonomy do not exist as binaries — but
rather they exist on a continuum. Shoehorning the daily experience of the smart city dweller into
such binary choices will only further falsify the lived experience of urbanites. Economic pressure
toward a “full disclosure future” [30] makes opting out a luxury good (Angwin, 2014).
By theorizing in terms of a spectrum of control we can draw connections between technologies that
were before thought of as discrete and independent. The innocuous is enfolded with the menacing.
Any significant technology of the smart city becomes a tool to be repurposed for later, often
unforeseeable goals. Claude LéviStrauss has compared human thought processes to the work of
the handyman, or bricoleur, who fixes problems as best he can with whatever tools or materials are
lying at hand (LéviStrauss, 1966). A similar process of bricolage will embed technologies of the
smart city into solutions proposed for problems large and small — and will, in turn, help define what
is viewed as a problem properly solved by the polity.

V. The soft power of biometric surveillance
At one end of the spectrum of control are the technologies that enact their power in subtle ways.
They are increasingly ubiquitous and become subsumed into the background of everyday life due to
their ‘invisibility’ (Star, 1999). That is, they can be functionally invisible because people no longer
notice their relationships and interactions with the technologies and/or physically invisible because
they are intangible or hidden.
Political philosopher Giorgio Agamben [31] explains this particularly curious mode as an “operation
of power that does not immediately affect what humans can do — their potentiality — but rather
their ‘impotentiality,’ that is, what they cannot do, or better, can not do.” Through this way of
operating, power is not limiting my capacity to do an action — in the conventional way of
constraining subjects — but instead is making it very difficult for me to not do an action. For
example, when few people had cellphones it was easy to not own or use one, but now that almost
everybody does — and increasingly more parts of our life our tied to the constant communication
and platform capabilities afforded by the device — it’s nearly impossible not to also conduct your life
via a cell/smartphone (Peppet, 2011; Morozov, 2014). The same can be said of automobiles: nothing
forces any given person to buy an automobile, but when infrastructure is constructed with private
vehicles assumed, and when there are scant other alternatives, it becomes difficult to not make the
choice.
Urban surveillance technologies — especially as they are implemented as part of massive,
networked systems — anchor the subtle end of the spectrum of control. Consider the closedcircuit
television (CCTV) arrays that already blanket the streets and buildings of major cities around the
world. CCTV is now emerging as a kind of “fifth utility” within cities (alongside gas, electricity, water,
and telecommunications). “Once CCTV systems are installed, their logic is inevitably expansionary.
Economies of scale are very marked — once a system is built and monitoring personnel are
employed, it makes sense to cover larger and larger areas” [32]. In the ‘smart city,’ such
surveillance systems rush down the path towards ubiquity; they become subsumed into the
background of everyday life: always present, tirelessly watching, but rarely noticed.
CCTV is a flexible technology, with the potential for added layers of sophisticated software
incorporated into the hardware — such as biometrics that are linked to the indepth, personal
information held and managed by data brokers. The proliferation of surveillance systems as part of
‘smart’ initiatives, which are then enhanced by advanced analytics, changes the very political
economy of what it means to be a city dweller.
Let’s consider further the example of biometrics, which identify, measure, and collect a biological
trait or group of traits [33]. There are a wide variety of types of existing biometrics, with more in
development. Some of the most common focus on physical traits: faces, fingerprints, irises, retinas
and DNA. Others focus on behavioral traits: voice, signature, gait (how a person walks) and
keystrokes (speed and timing between key presses). In practice, biometric technologies employ a
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standard process across different types. A sample of the biological trait is collected using a sensor of
some kind, such as a camera for faces or a telephone for voices. Through the use of an algorithm
that extracts information from the biometric sample, the trait is then converted into a digital
representation called a “template,” which can be stored in a database. The larger the database, the
more templates there are to verify or identify subjects. The key component, though, is the algorithm
used to construct the template. This is the feature that distinguishes one biometric recognition
system as ‘better’ than others on markers like: can the algorithm quickly extract biometric
information? Can it do so in a variety of environmental circumstances? Can it create a template that
is accurate?
The potential role of biometrics in the information economy is huge — especially for the massive
databrokerage industry. During a 2013 U.S. Senate hearing, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, then
Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, said: “In 2012,
the data broker industry generated $156 billion in revenues. That’s more than twice the size of the
entire intelligence budget of the United States Government — all generated by the effort to learn
about, and sell, the details about our private lives.” [34] Biometrics present new ways to convert
data into profit, a figurative stripmining bodies (and their actions) so that ever more actionable
information can be extracted from them. This analogy captures the degree of intrusiveness that
biometrics have when they hone in on particular biological traits and pull them out of the context of
the rest of the body, person, and environment.
The finer grain, personalized data provided through biometrics would be like gold in the data
brokers’ servers, enabling companies to significantly finetune the way they target potential
customers and providing government agencies with additional ways to oversee populations. “Despite
consumer data broker companies’ clear links with credit rating agencies, revenues numbering in the
billions, exemption from state regulations to protect consumers from identity theft, and documented
data breaches, the average citizen has likely never heard of these powerful corporations” [35].
Since these brokers collate data and construct profiles through whatever means available, by adding
biometric algorithms and databases to the mix, these brokers, and crucially their clients, accumulate
troves of data to the point that they may know more intimate details about persons (including
income, debt, illness, criminal records, and drugs taken) than their families do. Some highend
stores already use facial recognition software to alert clerks and salespeople that a VIP or a
celebrity is in the store (Salinas, 2013). With large enough databases, what’s to prevent stores from
identifying even nonVIP customers who walk in the door?
The acceleration of profiling and personalization is a natural consequence of big data business
strategies. Firms at the center of the big data economy claim that their data troves reverse the
common economic law of diminishing marginal returns. The more data a firm has, the more its
existing store is worth, since contextualization of profiles enables ever greater power of sorting,
control, price discrimination — and even blackmail.
These implications, among others, are consequences of the ways biometrics allow — and encourage
— more intensive commodification of physical bodies. “Biometrics break bodies down into their
component parts in ways that allow them to be marketed more easily in the transnational
marketplace ... The flimsy material body is rendered rugged as biometric technologies make the
body replicable, transmittable, and segmentable” [36]. We’ve heard of the data economy, but how
about the face economy, or iris economy or gait economy? There are entire corporate sectors eager
to mine that data and put it to use in any number of ways: data brokers construct indepth
consumer profiles replete with biometric templates; salespeople and store security use biometric
emanations to pull up your reputation from the database; and your identity is pinned to your
location, which is better tracked as you move through the streets, public squares and shops.
Insurance companies, for instance, are hungry for the somatic data provided by personal health and
fitness monitoring devices (Sadowski, 2014a). Imagine what they, and others, could do with the
knowledge and power provided by diverse types of biometrics.
Thus, biometrics present a way to not only dividualize people at minute scales, but also provide the
means to intensify commodification — via stripmining the newly available sources of data — and
control — via biopolitical management — of people, all while the ‘smart city’ constructs a conducive
platform for these activities.
The technological systems installed within cities to make them more connected, efficient, secure,
and smart don’t exist in a vacuum. They “absorb and reproduce the dominant cultural values of the
contemporary political economy” [37]. At the subtle end of the spectrum of control, the systems act
on us in ways that are functionally and/or physically invisible; few even know about data brokers,
intrusive surveillance, and the ways we become incorporated into the data flows of capital. And even
then, we “consent” by default because the options to not do things that pull us into the logics of
these systems — such as not using digital platforms, not using smartphones, not going to stores and
streets without a mask, not living in a populated area — can hardly be considered real choices for
the vast majority of citizens.
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VI. The hard power of policing technologies
On the other end of the spectrum are technologies of control that enact their power in aggressive,
violent ways. Consider how the current tactical and technological trends of urban policing are
consolidating power in security and enforcement agencies. An increasing number of highly publicized
protests from around the world have had the side effect of revealing — and ramping up — some of
the suppression methods state forces are employing when confronted with an organized public. The
police responses to protests — large and small, peaceful and riotous — are often severe and
militarized (Balko, 2013).
Clashes between protesters and police at Occupy (in hundreds of sites in the U.S. in 2011, and in
Hong Kong in 2014) and #BlackLivesMatter (in the wake of the Darren Wilson and Daniel Pantaleo
grand jury decisions) escalated from ordinary policing to paramilitary pacification, sometimes in a
matter of minutes. Such footage could easily be confused with a battalion of troops holding the line
against insurgents in the urban battlespace [38]. The science of protest management — replete with
“sublethal weapons” like earpaining longrange acoustic devices (LRADs) and nervedamaging,
plastic handcuffs — typically manages to disperse the crowd in short order. Violent and even
sexualized harassment is also distressingly common. When challenged verbally, authorities all too
often doubledown and wield physical force to impose order. Riot gear, rifles, tasers, pepper spray,
dogs, water cannons, tear gas, monitoring, tracking, and arrests have all become normalized for
authorities.
Smart city technology could make the control of protests less physically violent, but ever more
precise and effective as a deterrent against collective action. In January 2014, protesters in Kiev,
Ukraine received an ominous mobile phone message from state authorities: “Dear subscriber, you
are registered as a participant in a mass riot.” That charge — thanks to tough new Ukrainian laws
against public gatherings — can come with a sentence of 15 years in prison (Walker and Grytsenko,
2014). These tactics are indicative of a move towards using technologies that breakup protests —
or even prevent them from happening in the first place — using a purely technological intervention.
The psychological effects go well beyond immediate confrontations. Just knowing it’s possible to be
arrested, at home or work, days after attending a protest — all thanks to remote registration in
police and homeland security dossiers — is enough to thin out the activist ranks. Or they may (as in
the case of Ukraine itself) raise the stakes to the point that protesters feel compelled to revolt, given
dark possibilities of collective punishment if the regime entrenches itself. Once again, the stakes rise
very quickly.
As Paul Virilio warned in “The state of emergency,” rapid pacification of threats can, in turn, lead to
an arms race in the intensity of threats. He has observed that “the reduction of warning time that
results from the supersonic speeds of assault leaves so little time for detection, identification and
response that in the case of a surprise attack the supreme authority would have to risk abandoning
his supremacy of decision by authorizing the lowest echelon of the defense system to immediately
launch antimissile missiles” [39]. Similarly, as protesters began to anticipate and evade blunt crowd
dispersal tactics, the leaders of a pervasively “smart city” would be tempted to embed algorithmic
deterrence into transport and policing systems. That creates a dangerous dynamic among
protesters: for while some may simply give up, others may, along the lines of the Ukrainian model,
decide that one should only strike the king with a killing blow — that is, the only politics worth
engaging is the complete overthrow of regimes determined to disadvantage peaceful dissenters. The
reformist space of democratic politics and collective action evaporates between the poles of
quiescence and revolution.
At present, “smart” crowd control technologies buttress acquiescence. Consider the work of the firm
Persistent Surveillance Systems. Police in the United States have begun to test the company’s
services, which use a civilian aircraft that allows authorities to cast a wide surveillance net across
the city (Friedersdorf, 2014). The company’s owner likens it to “a live version of Google Earth, only
with TiVo capabilities” (CampbellDollaghan, 2014). The technology lets police record, rewind, and
zoom aerial video so they can track the movements of specific vehicles and people within the city.
The crowd control potential of having a realtime and recorded eyeinthesky is vast. The escalation
of tracking capabilities isn’t surprising or new. It’s another layer on top of the extensive technologies
already deployed.
The spread of widearea, networked surveillance systems are a solid foundation and complement for
the next phase in automated law enforcement. As a group of academics — many of them from the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point — warn in a recent article, the typically manpowerintensive
methods of policing are undergoing technological changes. By delegating police activities to
technological systems — like algorithmic analyses, robotics, and broadspectrum sensors —
opportunities for dissent and protest are minimized. Any response by citizens becomes defanged.
These “automated systems scale efficiently, allow meticulous and tireless enforcement of many
laws, promise rapid dispatch of punishment, and offer financial incentives to law enforcement
agencies, governments, and purveyors of these systems” [40].
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Now consider the likely, nearterm possibility that authorities will aggressively deploy drones and
robots to “deal with” protesters. For instance, the South African company Desert Wolf has developed
a riotcontrol drone they call the Skunk, which is armed with a veritable arsenal of “sublethal”
capabilities. Along with strobe lights, cameras, and speakers, the Skunk comes equipped with four
paintball guns that can be loaded with “dye marker balls, pepper spray balls or solid plastic balls” in
order to “disperse or mark people in the crowd” (Doctorow, 2014). The Skunk is first being delivered
to mining industries to deal with employee strikes. Extending that logic to urban protests is not
difficult, since the logic is ultimately the same in both cases: subduing those who seek to interrupt
and change the current structures of power and capital. After all, by using some version of the
Skunk police forces can deal with dissent in ways even more effective, flexible, dehumanized, and
safe (for them). Calibrated robotic and drone interventions may eventually become part of the
furniture of ‘smart’ urban existence where all glitches in the city system are problems in need of
technofix responses — assumed as legitimate when used against protesters and drug dealers alike.
And the power of “nonviolent” police tactics is growing. Technological means threaten to even
prevent crowds from forming in the first place, thus moving from reactionary to prophylactic
strategies. San Francisco authorities manipulated both train schedules and wireless access to disrupt
protests. New York’s MTA has simply forced trains to bypass stations where protests are occurring,
to keep people from assembling. Police power to surveil large areas, use remote scare tactics,
automate escalation of enforcement, and even practice what’s being called “predictive policing” is
supposed to lead to a more orderly society [41]. To the extent such measures deter legitimate
protest, they entrench a more mechanized, inorganic society — one where surveillance is used to
capture, and replay, one set of power relations, over and over again. The body politic mummifies
into a very different type of social organization: a leviathan machine.
The result is a selfreinforcing sense of alienation and passivity. An underclass is created, whether
materially, politically, or (most likely) both. The subjects of the smart city are simply herded along
toward maximally productive activity (via nudges or shoves), rarely if ever given the time to
questioning the how or why of their own opportunities or aspirations. When big data is touted as a
way to understand and control society without sufficient attention to the history (or patterns of
thought) that gave rise to the data analyzed, it is set to rationalize unjust patterns of extraction and
discipline. A finance firm may say, for example, “we charge 15 percent interest to someone who had
a past default, just because past patterns of data show that such people often default again,” in a
process agnostic as to whether a defiant refusal to repay, or a family medical emergency, caused
the prior default. Similarly, the police may say, “we’re intensively policing this neighborhood
because it had 10 percent more crime in the past.” But what if defaults resulted from excessive
interest rates in the past, caused by discriminatory lending practices? And what if the abovenormal
crime rate in the neighborhood simply reflected past patterns of intense policing that reflected
racism? What if each decision makes future defaults, or excess crime rates, more likely? Then the
“science of society” promised by big data morphs into a subjugation of certain parts of society. The
algorithms behind such judgments become less “objective arbiters” of opportunity and punishment,
than ways of laundering subjective, biased decisions into ostensibly objective, fair scores. Those
affected lose a chance at individualized treatment and understanding, as technical systems treat
people as a mere collection of data points.
Stephen Graham argues, in a 2011 interview with Democracy now!, that cities are the “foundation
space for democracy.” They can be thought of as a staging ground for public reactions and protests
— a spotlight on larger social issues. Yet, transforming urban space into a highly technologized,
secured environment reinforces and normalizes the view that anything but subdued acceptance of
the status quo is unwelcomed, and thus must be contained and stopped. In his book Cities under
siege, Graham (2011) argues that the capacity for democratic action is under attack. He writes,
“Militarized police cordons, often supplemented with preemptive detentions and bans on the right to
protest, try — often violently — to confine protestors for long periods in space where they have little
exposure to the media and few opportunities to communicate their political message” [42]. In short,
the actions of protestors and whistleblowers, activists and advocates, are not always valued as
integral parts of a flourishing society. That can be just as dangerous as the activities protesters,
properly, try to expose, call attention to, and deter.
Such trends in policing tactics and technologies are not necessarily caused by smart cities — they
are certainly occurring in places not touched by ‘smart’ initiatives — rather, the smart city opens the
door for new ways to intensify and entrench them. When urban infrastructures are rigged with
networks of surveillance, sensors, and algorithms, the ability for police forces to monitor city spaces
and mobilize action is enhanced. Such secondary uses of data render nugatory whatever initial
“consent” was given to the data collection that enabled them. Even more importantly, they threaten
to expand the boundaries of what counts as disorder and amplify the reaction to any efforts to
object to further militarization.
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VII. Cyborg urbanization, blurred boundaries
These technologies of control, on both sides and the spectrum, gain efficacy because — perhaps now
more than ever before — the boundaries between body–city–technology are blurred. There are not
so much discrete entities — the person, the building, the device — as there are entangled
assemblages of flesh, concrete, and information. And these connections amplify the ability of those
in power to coordinate and channel apparatuses of control throughout the rhizomatic assemblages.
The modern city, then, has to be theorized in terms of “cyborg urbanization.” The city dweller is
better understood as an urban cyborg: one who doesn’t live in the city, but who lives as part of the
city. As geographer Matthew Gandy puts it,
The emphasis of the cyborg on the material interface between the
body and the city is perhaps most strikingly manifested in the
physical infrastructure that links the human body to vast technological
networks. If we understand the cyborg to be a cybernetic creation, a
hybrid of machine and organism, then urban infrastructures can be
conceptualized as a series of interconnecting lifesupport systems.
[43]
The infrastructure provides for human needs: running water; climate controlled environments; food
preparation and delivery; routes for mobility and transportation; places for social gathering.
Disruptions after disasters like Hurricane Sandy remind us of just how fragile these systems can be
and how deeply we are wrapped up in them. But just as we think of the role physical architecture
plays in guiding and sustaining city dwellers, we must now also think of the role software
architecture has in city governance.
As people become urban cyborgs, bodies merged with cities, our interfaces with the system grow
more entangled. The libertarian fantasy of the cyborg envisions the human as an island: armored
with an exoskeleton, temperature and blood sugar levels automatically maintained, the überrobot
wants for nothing, fears nothing. However, the health of the individual depends on the health of the
sociotechnical collective. And the move from analog to digital infrastructures has only deepened this
integration. Such technologies exist ubiquitously and invincibly. The watchword here is “natural user
interface,” which aims for frictionless interaction. It portends cybernetic existence without kinetic
interference. The urban cyborg’s life is mediated and structured by technologies in ways large and
small, obvious and unnoticed.
In the “Cyborg manifesto,” Donna Haraway [44] wrote, “No objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in
themselves; any component can be interfaced with any other if the proper standard, the proper
code, can be constructed for processing signals in a common language.” Part of her project here
was to map the largescale “transitions from the comfortable old hierarchical dominations to the
scary new networks” she calls “informatics of domination.” Similarly, Deleuze [45] said, “We’re
moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people but through continuous
control and instant communication.” For him, this transition corresponds with “cybernetic machines
and computers,” yet we must also realize “the machines don’t explain anything, you have to analyze
the collective arrangements of which the machines are just one component.” These interventions
from Deleuze and Haraway suggest a technopolitical logic of cyborg cities more menacing — but
potentially more emancipatory — than the bland technocratic meliorism of “smart cities.” If we can
see ourselves as part of a cyborg city, simultaneously wholes and parts of a whole — not only
interacting with the rhizomatic urban assemblages, but as part of them — the valence of the cyborg
metaphor shifts. The “body politic” takes on new meaning.
The cyborgification of city life raises critical questions about an interlocking series of existential and
social questions. Computerized implementation of rewards and penalties, welfare and policing, are
premised on a series of decisions as to whether any given (in)dividual should be controlled, or
granted opportunity; should be invested in, or treated as a site of extraction. Existentially, the city
dweller must decide whether to compete for investment, or to challenge existing power structures,
or simply to drift, swept along by the decisions of those who create the circumstances that others
merely endure.
And as our lives increasingly take place within “coded space” — spaces that are augmented by
digitally inscribed information — and “code/space” — spaces that are so infused with information that
it is a necessary component of their functioning — the power of computerized processes becomes
even more pervasive and inescapable (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011). While the term code can connote
law (as in the Internal Revenue Code) or software (which involves the “coding” of instructions into
machinereadable formats) (Lessig, 1999), it can also suggest a deliberately hidden meaning.
Someone sends a “coded message” in order to avoid detection, to keep third parties from
understanding exactly what is going on. In algorithmic decisionmaking, this third, mysterious aspect
of code too often predominates. For example, with credit decisions, there are so many vague or
conflicting codes that it is possible to rationalize virtually any move of a credit score after many
credit events. Maybe you have too many accounts open, maybe you have too few — either could
contribute, at any given time, to a decision to reduce a credit score or reject an application. The
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answer to who is making decisions that dictate access, resource distribution, mobility, and more, is
opaque — because the correct question might be what is making those decisions.
With all the optimistic promises and hopeful visions surrounding ‘smart cities’ it can be easy to lose
track of the politics that are coded into these interconnected technologies and initiatives. If we
conceptualize these urban transformations as merely neutral enhancements that bring unalloyed
goods of efficiency and security, then we miss out on the sociopolitical, even ontological, aspects of
what it means to be entangled in these rhizomatic mechanisms, assimilated deeper into the
functioning of the cyborg city, and controlled by algorithmic decisions and technologically extended
force.

VIII. Taking back control
We expect that our analyses of politics in the smart city and our reinterpretation of its
sociotechnical assemblages as a cyborg city should have normative import. Within the context of the
“spectrum of control” we can derive support for the principle of “the right to the city.” This right
originated from Henri Lefebvre as a means for people to take back the urban social space by
challenging the abuses of capital through a reimagination of the duties and prerogatives of
citizenship (Purcell, 2002). In the context of globalized neoliberal and technocratic ideologies, such a
right then takes on new importance — and serves as a rallying call for challenging the technologies
of control that proliferate and engulf us.
David Harvey, in his landmark paper on the subject, forcefully explains what the right to the city
entails:
The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from
that of what kind of social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles,
technologies and aesthetic values we desire. The right to the city is
far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a
right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a
common rather than an individual right since this transformation
inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape
the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our
cities and ourselves is ... one of the most precious yet most neglected
of our human rights. [46]
This type of plasticity is not simply a matter of ensuring a living wage, or some bare subsistence
standard of living, for all in the “smart city” — however crucial such measures are. Rather, it is a
critical aspect of human freedom, if the term is to have enduring meaning in an environment where
corporate and government actors are honing ever more sophisticated means of monitoring, control,
and manipulation (Unger, 2004).
Julie Cohen has sketched a broad outline of further normative responses to the rise of smart
technologies and networked intelligences. Resisting the big data logic, that more data is always
better, she pursues “semantic discontinuity” between different knowledge gathering and parsing
systems (Cohen, 2012). The pursuit of complete interoperability, legibility, and access between data
systems must be closely interrogated, and often blocked.
The grim results of overreach are already clear. For example, vertical integration of municipal,
state, and federal law enforcement data, plus horizontal joinder of intelligence and investigative
systems of military and police forces, in the United States (via the fusion center apparatus), resulted
in a series of snafus and civil liberties violations with little if any discernable impact on public safety
(Citron and Pasquale, 2011). Early, clumsy efforts at health data integration in the U.K. outraged
patients when authorities decided to sell the data to insurers. Each of these episodes should serve as
a cautionary tale for the wouldbe architects of smart cities: without consistent citizen consultation
and serious penalties for misuse of data, their apparatus of omniveillance could easily do more harm
than good.
The smart city’s legitimacy also depends on its evenhandedness. There are curious gaps in this
apparatus of control. Somehow, certain corporate lawbreakers are rarely, if ever, monitored, let
alone punished. By contrast, the average person is dividualized by the rhizomatic apparatus because
the dividual can be better analyzed, penetrated, and controlled. As Jonathan Crary’s (2013) 24/7:
Late capitalism and the ends of sleep shows, the military logic of eternal vigilance is gradually
filtering into capitalist assumptions about work and subsistence wages. If the shift towards smart
cities provides a technocratic rational for governments to dutifully double down on entrepreneurial
forms of governance (Harvey, 1989), they will deserve resistance. Merely serving as “political
technological assemblages designed to naturalize and justify new assets for the circulation of capital
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and its rationalities within cities” [47], the sensors of the smart city will amount to little more than a
technologized reimposition of old chains.
Commentators have already observed the resurrection of early capitalist piecework in the guise of a
“gig economy.” Planners should acknowledge that slavery was not a deviation from capitalist
imperatives, but one variation of them, and its lesser forms are always available to aggressive
governmentcorporate leaders seeking to maximize extractive potential (Baptist, 2014). In other
words, as Cory Doctorow has provocatively argued, “Our networks have given the edge to the
elites, and unless we seize the means of information, we are headed for a long age of [ICT]
powered feudalism, where property is the exclusive domain of the superrich, where your
surveillancesupercharged Internet of Things treats you as a tenantfarmer of your life, subject to a
license agreement instead of a constitution” (Doctorow, 2015).
Fair distribution of the value arising out of the new data streams is critical. The work of being
watched (Andrejevic, 2004) is not fairly compensated (Scholz, 2013). Acting as human information
nodes in the urban network is becoming another civic and economic duty that smart city dwellers
are expected to perform. As Jennifer Gabrys explains, “Monitoring and managing data in order to
feed back information into urban systems are practices that become constitutive of citizenship.
Citizenship transforms into citizen sensing, embodied through practices undertaken in response to
(and communication with) computational environments and technologies” [48]. To the extent
corporations derive commercial value from this data, there must be provisions for equitable benefit
sharing (Lanier, 2011). Otherwise, persons as dividuals will merely multiply the power of others to
exploit rhizomatic connections, by providing ever more data flowing on networks.
At present, smart city boosters are far too prone to assume that a benevolent intelligence animates
the networks of sensors and control mechanisms they plan to install. The “core values, orientations,
usually unspoken (even unconscious) assumptions and beliefs about how political and economic
system should be structured and the roles that various actors can and should play,” are part of what
Jonathan Swarts calls a “neoliberal politicaleconomic imaginary” [49]. The predictable result is a
failure of imagination: a normative agenda either mired in slight refinements in existing patterns of
objects and data, or freefloating utopianism about governance as a machine that would go of itself.
We have sought to provide the critical foundation needed to articulate the smart city’s emancipatory
potential for all its residents, rather than the elite, (mostly) men behind the curtain of its sensory
apparatus. It is against that democratic egalitarian goal — of fair benefit and burden sharing — that
alleged “smartenings” of the city must be measured.
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Notes
1. We use the words “smart” and “smart city” in scare quotes throughout the introduction to draw
attention to the way that thoroughly normative language has become part of the established
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discourse about how we even call and refer to these technologies and initiatives. After all, who wants
to be “dumb” or reject “smart” — the very discourse provides supporters an a priori advantage.
2. http://share.cisco.com/internetofthings.html.
3. Sterling, 2014, loc. 68.
4. Ibid.
5. Shelton, et al., 2015, p. 16.
6. Hollands, 2008, p. 307.
7. Kitchin, 2014, p. 6.
8. Greenfield, 2013, loc. 1274.
9. Hollands, 2015, p. 70.
10. Kitchin and Dodge, 2011, p. 131.
11. Geertz, 1973, p. 194.
12. Solum, 2014, p. 75.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Mirowski, 2013, p. 58.
16. http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=d3e33bde
30fd4899b30d906b47e117ca&ContentType_id=14f995b9dfa5407a9d35
56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39afe0334cba9221de668ca1978a (11 February 2015), accessed 2
April 2015.
17. Goldsmith and Crawford, 2014, p. 6.
18. Goldsmith and Crawford, 2014, p. 112.
19. Goldsmith and Crawford, 2014, p. 4.
20. Cotterell, 2006, p. 15.
21. Foucault, 1990, p. 139, emphasis original.
22. Foucault, 1990, p. 136, emphasis original.
23. Gabrys, 2014, p. 32.
24. Habermas, 1996, p. 306.
25. Deleuze, 1995, pp. 181–182.
26. Langdon Winner (1977) provides several examples in the opening sections of Autonomous
technology.
27. Mirowski, 2013, p. 77.
28. This concept functions as what Robert Merton (1968, p. 39) calls a “middlerange theory,” which
is intermediate to the “allinclusive speculations” of “grand” social theories and the “minor working
hypotheses” that are abundant in descriptive empirical research. Following from Merton, we find this
level of theory to be appropriate to social theory, for it develops at the beneficial point of overlap
between concrete fact and abstract theory.
29. Taylor, 1971, p. 3.
30. Peppet, 2011, p. 1,153.
31. Agamben, 2010, p. 43.
32. Graham, 2002, p. 238.
33. This discussion of biometrics is a modified and expanded version of Sadowski (2014b). We thank
Al Jazeera America for allowing us to use parts of this article here.
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34. The transcript of this hearing — called “What information do data brokers have on consumers,
and how do they use it?” — can be found at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=a5c3a62c68a647359d18916bdbbadf01&Statement_id=a47c081a
d65342728d12d6edc1e04dc6&ContentType_id=14f995b9dfa5407a9d35
56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39afe0334cba9221
de668ca1978a&MonthDisplay=12&YearDisplay=2013 (18 December 2013).
35. Roderick, 2014, p. 740.
36. Magnet, 2011, p. 12.
37. Monahan, 2010, pp. 99–100.
38. Graham, 2009; Virilio, 2005, p. 187.
39. Virilio, 2009, p. 204.
40. Shay, et al., forthcoming: p. 4; McCoy, 2009.
41. An article in The Police Chief magazine (Beck and McCue, 2009), coauthored by the Chief of
Detectives for LAPD and the CEO of a security consultancy, asks: “Predictive policing: What can we
learn from WalMart and Amazon about fighting crime in a recession?” Hint: quite a lot, apparently.
42. Graham, 2011, p. 121.
43. Gandy, 2005, p. 28.
44. Haraway, 1991, p. 163.
45. Deleuze, 1995, pp. 174–175.
46. Harvey, 2008, p. 23.
47. Vanolo, 2014, p. 884.
48. Gabrys, 2014, p. 34.
49. Swarts, 2013, pp. 16–17.
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